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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  08-1527
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSE BRITO,
                   Appellant.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 00-cr-00635)
District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 12, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 25, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
2José Brito appeals his sentence for the third time.  We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only those facts necessary
to our disposition.  
Brito pleaded guilty to ten counts arising from his involvement in illegal drug
trafficking activity.  On October 24, 2003, the District Court sentenced Brito to 235
months  imprisonment, which was at the bottom of the 235 to 293 months Guidelines
range.  On March 25, 2005, we remanded Brito’s case for resentencing pursuant to United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Although Brito’s Guidelines imprisonment range
remained 235 to 293 months, the District Court granted Brito a substantial downward
variance to 140 months based on its finding that the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine
disparity was too harsh.  Brito and the Government appealed that sentence.
On August 17, 2007, we vacated the 140-month sentence and remanded the case
for resentencing because the District Court erred under then-prevailing precedent in
categorically rejecting the 100-to-1 crack/powder disparity.  Upon remand, Brito sought
the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months imprisonment in light of the District
Court’s previous variance, the inherent unfairness of the crack/powder disparity, and his
good conduct while in jail.  The Government argued for a sentence falling within the
Guidelines range.
3In November 2007, prior to Brito’s resentencing hearing, the Sentencing
Commission issued Amendment 706, which lowered the base offense level for most crack
offenses by two levels and resulted in a new Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months in
Brito’s case.  A month later, the Supreme Court issued Kimbrough v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 558 (2007), which held that a district court may consider the Guidelines’
crack/powder disparity in determining an appropriate sentence.
At the resentencing on February 13, 2008, the District Court explained that its
previous sentence was not the result of a categorical rejection of the crack/powder
disparity, but rather, the result of careful consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors
as required by Booker.  The District Court exercised its discretion under Kimbrough and
reinstated the 140-month sentence, finding that the sentence it had previously imposed
remained just and proper under Booker and Kimbrough.
II.
Brito argues that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing the same
sentence it had imposed prior to Kimbrough and Amendment 706.  After applying the
two-level reduction as required by Amendment 706, Brito claims the District Court
should have reduced his sentence from 140 months to the statutory mandatory minimum
of 120 months.
We review the District Court’s sentence under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard.  Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).  Our review of the record
4demonstrates that the District Court took pains to explain that its initial 140-month
sentence — a sentence that falls below the Guidelines range — was reasonable and
appropriate in light of the § 3553(a) factors, Kimbrough and Amendment 706.  In
resentencing Brito to 140 months imprisonment, the District Court weighed Brito’s
personal characteristics, including his age and lack of a prior criminal record, as well as
the serious nature of the offense.  The District Court then considered the sentencing
disparities between crack and powder cocaine, and acknowledged the two-level reduction
in the Guidelines calculation pursuant to Amendment 706.  Accordingly, we hold that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the same 140-month sentence.
III.
Brito next argues that the crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentence and
Guidelines range deprive him of due process under the Fifth Amendment.  We review this
argument for plain error because it was not raised previously.  United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734-45 (1993).
This Court has consistently found that there is a rational basis for the crack/powder
disparity, and that it does not violate substantive rights.  See, e.g., United States v.
Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992).  Since this was the case before Booker and
Kimbrough, it is ever more so now that district courts may take into account the disparity
in calculating a sentence, and grant a variance where appropriate.  Accordingly, we
5summarily reject Brito’s Fifth Amendment challenge and will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
